Introduction
Asset managers in the stock market either opt for active or passive portfolio strategies. One important strategy involving active trading is the return-based momentum strategy that buys recent winner stocks and sells short loser stocks Titman 1993, 2001 ). The extensive evidence of the profitability of momentum trading has undoubtedly underpinned the interest of investment practitioners. Many studies demonstrate the statistically significant model alpha of the momentum profit using either the CAPM or multi-factor models (see, for example, Fama and French (1993) , Avramov and Chordia (2006) , Sagi and Seasholes (2007) and Liu and Zhang (2008) ). Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) further show that after controlling for transaction costs the momentum strategies remain profitable.
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In contrast, the formation of an equally weighted stock portfolio is widely adopted among passive portfolio managers. Benartzi and Thaler (2001) , for example, document this simple 1/N rule for allocating wealth across assets. DeMiguel et al. (2009) denote the 1/N allocation rule as a 'naive diversification strategy' and show that the profits of the 1/N rule are comparable to those of 'optimal' portfolio strategies. Huberman and Jiang (2006) found that 401(k) participants tended to allocate their contributions evenly across their selected funds. Benartzi and Thaler (2007) examine the asset allocation behavior for retirement savings funds and provide evidence that "investors are relatively passive . . . and they adopt naive diversification strategies". Banerjee and Hung (2011) provide a new methodology to evaluate the performance of an active momentum 'asset manager'. Their method rewards and penalizes the momentum strategist for using past return information in the formation of the strategies. To this end, they construct 'naive investors' who 656 Feature use no information and weight risky assets randomly. Overall, they find that, over the long run, the rewards and penalties cancel out and that the momentum strategist is no better than a simple 'naive' randomizer. One interesting outcome of the construction of this universe of naive investors is that the median naive investor follows the 'naive diversification strategy' or the 1/N allocation rule. Essentially, such a 1/N allocation rule is a passive strategy that tracks the equally weighted stock portfolio without using past information.
In this paper, we aim to understand the merits and demerits of the active momentum trading and this passive 1/N strategy. For this purpose we examine their raw and risk-adjusted profits and idiosyncratic variances (in other words, the variance of returns due to stock selection Sharpe (1992) ). We further investigate the relation between these strategies in terms of their correlation and the dimensions of risk exposures.
We consider a naive diversification strategy (NDS) that is long in the equally weighted (1/N ) portfolio of stocks and short in the risk-free asset at the beginning of a period. This creates an initial zero-net-worth position as in the momentum strategies. The returns on the 1/N portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate, using the one-month Treasury bill rate as a proxy, are thus the profits of the zero-net-worth strategies of the NDS. At the end of the period the NDS re-balances the stock portfolio in order to remain equally weighted. The NDS then holds the portfolio for the next period and continues to be financed at the risk-free rate. This strategy can be implemented practically and tracked over time.
The momentum strategies (MS) first form portfolios of the winner (top 10% past returns) and the loser (bottom 10% past returns) stocks and then hold a long position on the winner portfolio and a short position on the loser portfolio. The momentum strategies further execute intensive trading in order to establish overlapping strategy positions.
We use the monthly equity data of the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ over the sample period between 1926 and 2005, various sub-sample periods and 100 randomly selected 10-year periods. The set of sample stocks that we use to construct the equally weighted portfolio is the same as that for constructing the momentum strategies. We find that the average profit of the NDS is around 1% per month, close to that of the MS, in our sample period and in the sub-sample periods of Titman (1993, 2001) . The MS generates the same level of profits as the NDS during the period of bull markets such as the dot-com bubble and makes profits from selling short the losers in the great depression period. Further, we divide the sample into two groups of large and small size stocks for the various sub-sample periods and find that, in each size group, the difference between the average profits of the NDS and the MS is close to zero and statistically insignificant.
Moreover, the variance of the idiosyncratic component of the momentum profits is 20 times higher than the NDS profits. Importantly, the risk-adjusted alpha of the difference in profits between the momentum and the NDS is virtually zero and statistically insignificant. The NDS and the momentum strategies are orthogonal, i.e. their profits have zero correlation. The momentum profits show a positive market beta and a significant loading of nearly 1 on the momentum factor. In contrast, the NDS has a significantly positive market beta, but does not have significant exposure on the momentum factor.
On a risk-adjusted basis, the winners outperform the NDS by 14 basis points per month, while the losers under-perform the NDS by 18 basis points per month. The results, taken together, suggest that asset managers might be able to earn higher riskadjusted excess returns than the NDS by either taking a long position in the winner portfolio, or by taking a short position in the loser portfolio. The MS, however, are not better off pursuing the combined long-short trading because a simple strategy that equally weights the feasible set of stocks can achieve the same level of average profit, either raw or risk-adjusted, as the momentum strategies, but with lower idiosyncratic variance.
Our findings are robust with respect to sampling and periodspecific effects as we simulate the distributions of the average returns of the winner and the loser portfolios as well as the momentum profits by re-sampling with replacements. In each of the 100 randomly chosen 10-year periods we use all stocks feasible for trading in the sample during that period, and then construct the empirical distribution of the average profits. At the 5% level, all of the 100 samples accept the null hypothesis that the momentum profits are equivalent to the profits of the NDS. We further consider the momentum strategies based on 12-month formation and 12-month holding periods as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) . Overall, our results still hold, showing that adopting naive 1/N diversification is a good investment policy relative to the 12-month momentum strategies.
Our findings are important for practitioners and investors. The results illustrate that the MS requires the analysis of past return information and then takes both sides of the extreme return positions, thereby taking up the risk from the tails of the return distribution. By doing so, they significantly reduce the exposure to the market risk but face large dispersions in the profits.
The NDS, by contrast, simply weights stocks equally and performs as well as the MS, and even has lower idiosyncratic variance. From a practical point of view, pursuing the active momentum strategies would not be beneficial once further taking into account the costs of the intensive long-short trading, the risks and regulation restrictions on short sales of stocks. † The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines the naive diversification strategy and the momentum strategies. In section 3 we examine the profitability of these strategies over the whole sample period, some interesting subsample periods, and 100 randomly selected 10-year periods. Section 4 analyses the theoretical and empirical relations between the momentum and the 1/N naive diversification strategies, risk factor exposures and idiosyncratic variance. Section 5 concludes.
The naive 1/N diversification strategy and the momentum strategies
We define N stocks that are feasible for trading at a given month as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) . The set of N stocks we use for forming the NDS strategies is in fact the same †Jones and Lamont (2002) , for example, describe the difficulties of short sales, including the risks, costs, legal and institutional restrictions, and the need of sufficient stock supply from investors who are willing to lend. We includes all stocks classified as ordinary common shares (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) with exchange codes of 1, 2 and 3 as of the end of the previous year. We thus exclude all non-common equities such as American deposit receipts, companies incorporated outside of the U.S., shares of beneficial interests, certificates, real estate investment trusts, close-end funds, etc. A stock must meet the following criteria in order to be included for analysis: first, a stock must have observations on returns for the current month and over the past 6 or 12 months (depending on the respective analysis period), stock price, and shares outstanding. Second, a stock must have a price equal to or higher than $5 at portfolio formation. Our tests focus on the representative overlapping momentum strategies that form portfolios by sorting stocks on their past 6-month compounded returns and hold portfolios for 6 months. At the end of each month, the stocks within the top 10% of past returns comprise the winner portfolio F W , and stocks within the bottom 10% of past returns comprise the loser portfolio F L . Portfolios are equally weighted at formation and are held for six months without re-balancing during the holding period. † The momentum strategy is then defined as
Denote r = [r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r N ] as the vector of returns on the feasible stocks in excess of the risk-free rate r f . We compute monthly excess portfolio returns (r W = r F W and r L = r F L ) and the profits, r P = r F P , for the momentum strategies using single-period returns as in Liu and Strong (2008) . The momentum strategies have six overlapping strategy positions, each starting one month apart. The monthly portfolio returns from the overlapping strategies are averages of the six strategies as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) .
We construct the '1/N naive diversification strategy' over these N feasible stocks. The excess portfolio returns from the strategy, 1
, where r is effectively the profit of the 1/N naive diversification strategy. Banerjee and Hung (2011) demonstrate that this strategy does not involve information costs and is the cross-sectional mean and the projection median of their uniformly distributed random strategies.
Profitability of the strategies
The top panel of figure 1 plots the time-series of profit differences between the momentum and the NDS strategies. The profit differences mainly center around zero and exhibit sporadic deviations from zero most of the time. During the †In the case where a stock is delisted during the holding period, the liquidating proceeds are reinvested in the remaining stocks in the portfolio.
periods from 1929 through 1933 and in the late 1990s, however, there exist large positive and negative deviations. These periods correspond, respectively, to the great depression and the dot-com bubble. We thus carefully examine these subsample periods.
Panel A of table 1 presents the average excess returns of the winner and the loser portfolios, the average momentum profits as well as the average differences in excess returns between these portfolios and the NDS. The winner and the loser portfolios have average excess returns of 1.78% and 0.70% per month, respectively. The momentum strategies generate a statistically significant average profit of 1.08% per month. Strikingly, the average profit of the NDS is as high as 1.06% per month and is highly significant. The winner portfolio outperforms the NDS by a statistically significant 0.72% per month, while the loser portfolio under-performs the NDS by a statistically significant 0.36% per month. Importantly, the average difference between the profits of the momentum and the zero-net-worth NDS strategies is virtually zero and statistically insignificant.
We next look into the question of whether size matters in our analysis. For this purpose, we divide the sample, each month, into two groups of large and small size stocks using the median of the market value of all sample stocks at the end of the previous month as the cut-off point. We then form the momentum and the zero-net-worth NDS strategies within each of the groups. Panel A of table 2 shows that, in each size group, the difference between the average profits of the momentum and the NDS strategies is close to zero and statistically insignificant. Within the sample of small size stocks, the average monthly momentum profit is five basis points lower (but statistically insignificant) than that of the NDS; within the sample of large size stocks, the average momentum profit is 11 basis points higher (but statistically insignificant) than that of the NDS.
Over sub-sample periods
Next, we examine the profitability of the momentum and the 1/N naive diversification strategies over the sample periods of Titman (1993, 2001 ) from 1965 to 1989 and from 1990 to 1998, respectively. Panel B of table 1 shows that, over the former sub-period, the momentum strategies generate a statistically significant average profit of around 1.1% per month. The NDS has a statistically significant average monthly profit of 0.9%. The average difference in profits between the momentum and the NDS strategies is 0.18%, but statistically insignificant. Compared with the NDS, the winner portfolio significantly over-performs by 0.72%, while the loser portfolio significantly under-performs by 0.36% per month. The results in panel C of table 1 for the latter subperiod are similar. Again, there is virtually no difference in profits between the momentum and the NDS strategies. The middle panels of figure 1 plot the differences in profits between the momentum and the NDS strategies over the sample periods of Titman (1993, 2001) . The profit differences mainly center around zero and only exhibit sporadic deviations from zero.
As discussed above, we observe large profit differences between the momentum and the NDS strategies in the early and later periods of our sample. We therefore further examine the Feature Figure 1 . Distributions of the differences in profits between the momentum strategy and the NDS for the various sample periods. Table 1 . Profitability of the six-month momentum and the 1/N naive diversification strategies. This table presents mean excess returns of the momentum strategies and the 1/N naive diversification strategies (NDS) for the whole sample period (panel A), the sub-sample periods of Jagadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001 ) (panels B and C), the periods during the great depression (panel D) and the dot-com bubble (panel E). We use the one-month T-bill rate as a proxy for the risk-free rate. 'Winner' and 'Loser' are, respectively, the returns on the winner and the loser portfolios in excess of the one-month T-bill rate. 'Winner-NDS' and 'Loser-NDS' are, respectively, the return differences between 'Winner', 'Loser' and the NDS. 'Momentum profit-NDS' is the difference between the profits of the momentum and the NDS. per month, but the loser portfolio incurs an even larger average monthly loss of −2.41%. The average momentum profit of 0.72%, although statistically insignificant, mainly comes from the short position on the loser portfolio. The NDS also suffers an average monthly loss of −2.02%. The average of the excess returns on the winner portfolio is only 33 basis points higher than the average profit of the NDS, but statistically insignificant. The average difference in profits between the momentum and the NDS strategies, although as high as 2.74%, is statistically insignificant because of the greater volatility in this period. The right-hand panel of the lower part of figure 1 shows that the profit differences over this period display a few very large negative outliers.
Panel E of table 1 shows that, during the dot-com bubble period, the winner portfolio has an average monthly excess return of 3.96%, which is 2.37% higher than that of the NDS. The average excess return on the loser portfolio is 48 basis points lower than the NDS, albeit statistically insignificant. The average difference between the profits of the momentum and the NDS strategies is 1.27%, but statistically insignificant. The left-hand panel of the lower part of figure 1 shows that the Table 2 . Profitability of six-month momentum and the 1/N naive diversification strategies for large and small size stocks. This table presents mean excess returns of the momentum strategies and the 1/N naive diversification strategies for the sample periods as described in table 1. We use the one-month T-bill rate as a proxy for the risk-free rate. 'NDS' is the profit for the NDS . 'Momentum profit-NDS' is the profit difference between the momentum strategies and the NDS. profit differences over this period mostly center around zero.
The results in panels B, C, D and E of table 2 show that, in these sub-sample periods, the differences between the average profits of the momentum and the NDS strategies are statistically insignificant for both the large and small size groups. Overall, the momentum strategies do not outperform the NDS in all periods considered. The evidence suggests that, on average, an investor would be better off if he holds, each month, a portfolio of all feasible stocks with equal weights that is financed by borrowing at the risk-free rate. This is because this passive investment strategy generates an equivalent average profit and does not require sophisticated trading as do the momentum strategies.
One hundred randomly selected 10-year periods
ptWe designed a simulation experiment to determine whether the momentum strategies outperform the NDS in any given period and for any given set of assets. For each run, we selected an experimental period of 120 months with the starting month randomly chosen between July 1926 and December 1995. We then used all sample stocks in that period and the portfolio formation methods described above to form the momentum strategies and the NDS. The set of sample stocks that are used to construct the equally weighted portfolios is the same as that for constructing the momentum portfolios.
We draw 100 samples with replacements and obtain 100 sample averages for monthly excess returns of each of the winner and the loser portfolios as well as the profits of both the momentum and the NDS strategies.
We compute average excess returns of the momentum portfolios and an average monthly profit of the zero-net-worth NDS over the 120 months. We test, for each sample, the null hypoth-
using the T = 120 monthly profits of the momentum and the NDS strategies using the following t-statistic:
, s = 1, . . . , 100, where r P s , r s and std s (r P − r ) are the average momentum profit, the average profit of the NDS strategies and the standard deviation of the difference in profits between the momentum and NDS strategies, respectively, for the randomly chosen sample period s. We reject the null at the α% significance level when t s > t α , and count the number of non-rejections to indicate the number of periods when momentum strategies significantly outperform NDS strategies. We find that, at the 5% level, none of the 100 samples rejects the null and, at the 10% level, only four of the 100 samples reject the null. Figure 2 presents the distributions of these sample averages. The modes of average returns of the winner portfolio, the loser portfolios and the momentum profits are 1.83%, 0.69% and 1.19%, respectively. The average profits of the NDS have a mode of 1.18%. We also observe that, 95% of the time, the NDS gives statistically positive profits, whereas the corresponding figures for the winner portfolio, the loser portfolio and the momentum profits are 100%, 87% and 95%, respectively. The differences in profits between the momentum and the NDS strategies have a mode of 0.06 with a 53% chance of being positive. Hence, the 1/N diversifier is almost as good as the momentum strategist.
The relation between the momentum and the 1/N diversification strategies
We analyse the theoretical relation between the momentum and the 1/N naive diversification strategies by assuming that, for every period t, the cross-section of excess returns is characterized by a factor model:
is the vector of factor loadings, x t are common risk factors, σ 2 t is the idiosyncratic variance at time t and N t is the total number of assets at time t.
The idiosyncratic variance of NDS is simply Var(
Therefore, it is easy to see that the conditional mean of the excess returns on the winner and loser portfolios can be given by
Since F jit = 10/N t , if the ith asset is in the winner portfolio, we obtain the idiosyncratic variance as
Therefore, it immediately follows that the conditional mean and idiosyncratic variance of the momentum profits are
The above results suggest the theoretical relations that: (1) the momentum strategies and NDS are orthogonal to each other, and (2) the idiosyncratic variance of profits is 20 times higher than the idiosyncratic variance of the NDS. We test these predictions below.
Orthogonality
Under the assumptions made for the factor model (1) and from (2), the profits of the momentum strategies are orthogonal to the profits of the 1/N naive diversification strategies. We examine this prediction by plotting the excess returns on the winner portfolio, the loser portfolio and the momentum profits against the 1/N naive diversification strategies (r ) in figure 3 . The scatter plot shows that the slope coefficients for both r W and r L seem to be close to one and that the momentum profits are randomly scattered against r .
Formally, we run a weighted (by σ 2 t /N t ) linear regression (WLS) of the momentum profits on the profits of the NDS. Specifically, we examine the following time-series model to test the null H 0 : β P = 0:
where σ 2 t is the variance of ε t in (1), and N t is the total number of assets at time t.
The WLS results show a β P of −0.04 (t = 0.43), which is in line with the predictions of (2) and suggests that the momentum profits are orthogonal to the profits of the NDS. We also test whether the sensitivities of the winner and the loser portfolios on the NDS are statistically different from one. We run WLS regressions of excess portfolio returns on the profits of the NDS to test the null of H 0 : β W = β L = 1. The results show that β W = 0.85 and β L = 0.81 are both smaller than one with t = −1.91 and t = −2.52, respectively. 
Risk-adjusted profits and risk exposure
We examine the risk-adjusted profits and risk factor exposures of the momentum and the 1/N naive diversification strategies. Specifically, we run the time-series regression
where r jt is the excess portfolio return or profit for strategy j at time t, and MKT is the return on the CRSP value-weighted market index at time t in excess of the one-month T-bill rate. The Fama and French (1993) size factor, SMB, is defined as the monthly return difference between two portfolios that consist of large and small stocks. The Fama-French value factor, HML, is defined as the monthly return difference between two portfolios with high and low book-to-market equity ratio. The momentum factor, MOM , is the monthly return difference between two portfolios with high and low returns over the past Feature Table 3 . Risk exposures of the six-month momentum and the 1/N naive diversification strategies. Panel A reports the factor loadings of the excess returns on the winner ('Winner') and the loser ('Loser') portfolios, the momentum profits and the NDS for the period from January 1927 to December 2005. 'Momentum profit' is for the strategies that are long in the winner and short in the loser portfolios. Panel B reports the factor loadings of 'Winner-NDS', 'Loser-NDS' and 'Momentum profit-NDS', which are the differences between the excess returns of the winner and loser portfolios, the momentum profits and the profits of the NDS, respectively. MKT is the return on the CRSP value-weighted market index in excess of the one-month T-bill rate. SMB is the monthly return difference between two portfolios that consist of large and small size stocks. HML is the monthly return difference between two portfolios with high and low book-to-market equity ratios. MOM is the monthly return difference between two portfolios with high and low returns over the past 2 to 12 months. The t-statistics in parentheses are calculated by applying the Newey-West heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent standard errors. * , * * and * * * denote statistical significance at the 10level, respectively. Table 3 shows the regression results for the entire sample period. The Newey-West standard errors are applied to correct for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of residuals. Panel A shows that both the winner and loser portfolios are significantly exposed to the market, SMB and momentum factors. The momentum strategies have an average risk-adjusted profit of 0.3% per month and are marginally exposed to the market factor and with a highly significant loading of nearly 1 on the momentum factor, but with insignificant loadings on the SMB and HML factors. The NDS has a highly significant alpha of 0.25% per month with statistically significant loadings of 1.05, 0.42 and 0.09, respectively, on the market, SMB and HML factors. The NDS does not have significant exposure on the MOM factor. Thus the momentum and the NDS bear different sources of risk. After accounting for the factor exposures, the magnitude of the risk-adjusted momentum profit is close to that of the NDS.
Constant
Panel B of table 3 shows that the differences between the excess returns of the winner portfolio and the profits of the NDS have a positive and marginally significant alpha with positive and highly significant exposures to the market, SMB and MOM , but with a negative exposure to the HML factor. The differences between the excess returns of the loser portfolio and the profits of the NDS have a negative and marginally significant alpha with positive and highly significant exposures to the market and the SMB factor, but with a negative and highly significant exposure to the MOM factor. Importantly, the difference in profits between the momentum and the NDS has a very small and statistically insignificant alpha of seven basis points per month. †The returns on these factors are obtained from Ken French's data library.
Idiosyncratic variance ratio
We test the null hypothesis that the ratio of idiosyncratic variance (CVR = Var[r Pt |x t ]/Var(r t |x t )) between the momentum profits and the NDS profits are equal to 20 as is the prediction of (3). Specifically, we test the null hypothesis:
Since the idiosyncratic variance (σ 2 t ) and the number of assets (N t ) vary over time, we cannot use the traditional variance ratio test. We test this hypothesis by constructing a moment-based estimator for the CVR,
where v Pt and v NDSt are the residuals from the regressions in (4). Note that
The second equality follows from Heijmans (1999) . Finally, using (3) we obtain the expected variance ratio. Therefore, under the null hypothesis by the central limit theorem, the standardized statistic is
Under the null hypothesis E(CVR) = 20. We obtain a calculated ZCVR of 1.005 over the whole sample period, and, hence, accept the hypothesis that the idiosyncratic variance of the momentum portfolio is 20 times higher than the idiosyncratic variance of the NDS.
Feature Table 4 . Profitability of the 12-month momentum and the 1/N naive diversification strategies. This table presents mean excess returns of the momentum strategies (12 month by 12 month) and the 1/N naive diversification strategies (NDS) for the whole sample period (panel A), the sub-sample periods of Jagadeesh-Titman (1993 ) (panels B and C), the periods during the great depression (panel D) and the dot-com bubble (panel E). We use the one-month T-bill rate as a proxy for the risk-free rate. 'Winner' and 'Loser' are, respectively, the returns on the winner and the loser portfolios in excess of the one-month T-bill rate. 'Winner-NDS' and 'Loser-NDS' are, respectively, the return differences between 'Winner', 'Loser' and the NDS. 'Momentum profit-NDS' is the difference between the profits of the momentum and the NDS. Table 5 . Risk exposures of the 12-month momentum and the 1/N naive diversification strategies. Panel A reports the factor loadings of the excess returns on the (12 month by 12 month) winner ('Winner') and the (12 month by 12 month) loser ('Loser') portfolios, the momentum profits and the NDS for the period from January 1927 to December 2005. 'Momentum profit' is for the (12 month by 12 month) strategies that are long in the winner and short in the loser portfolios. Panel B reports the factor loadings of 'Winner-NDS', 'Loser-NDS' and 'Momentum profit-NDS', which are the differences between the excess returns of the winner and loser portfolios, the momentum profits and the profits of the NDS, respectively. M K T is the return on the CRSP value-weighted market index in excess of the one-month T-bill rate. SM B is the monthly return difference between two portfolios that consist of large and small size stocks. H M L is the monthly return difference between two portfolios with high and low book-to-market equity ratios. M O M is the monthly return difference between two portfolios with high and low returns over the past 2 to 12 months. The t-statistics in parentheses are calculated by applying the Newey-West heteroskedasticity-andautocorrelation-consistent standard errors. * , * * and * * * denote statistical significance at the 10level, respectively. 
Twelve-month momentum
For a robustness check, we further consider the momentum strategies based on 12-month formation and 12-month holding periods as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) . Using exactly the same criteria for the selection of the stock set, the stocks that are feasible for trading exclude those whose prices are below $5 at portfolio formation. Consistent with Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) , panel B of table 4 reports the average (12-by-12) momentum profit as 0.63% per month and statistically significant. Panel A for the entire sample period shows that the winner and the loser portfolios have average excess returns of 1.38% and 1.11% per month, respectively. The average momentum profit is 0.28% per month, but statistically insignificant. The average profit of the NDS remains statistically significant at 1.04% per month. The momentum strategies under-perform the zero-net-worth NDS strategies by 0.76% per month. The overall pattern of the results presented in table 4 shows that momentum strategies do not outperform the NDS strategies. Table 5 shows, for the entire sample period, the regression results and the t-statistics using the Newey-West standard errors. In contrast to the results in shows that the HML factor becomes statistically significant for the winner portfolio, the loser portfolio and the momentum profit. Further, the average risk-adjusted return on the winner portfolio is essentially zero and statistically insignificant, while the alpha of the NDS remains statistically significant at 0.25% per month.
Panel B of table 5 shows that the model alpha of the difference between the excess return on the winner portfolio and the NDS profit is now negative, reflecting the insignificant model alpha of the winner portfolio as shown in panel A, while the pattern of risk exposures is similar to that of the 6-month-by-6-month momentum. The model alpha of the difference between the loser portfolio and the NDS profit is close to zero and statistically insignificant. The model alpha of the difference in profits between the momentum and the NDS is a negative 28 basis points per month and statistically significant. Overall, the 12-month momentum strategies under-perform the NDS strategies.
Overall, our results still hold, and, in fact, the 12-month momentum strategies under-perform the NDS strategies, showing that the use of adopting the naive 1/N diversification is a good investment policy relative to the 12-month momentum strategies.
Conclusions
In this paper we examine the merits and demerits of the active momentum strategies that use stocks of the top and bottom 10% returns and the passive 1/N naive diversification strategy which is long in the equally weighted portfolio of stocks and short in the risk-free asset. The momentum and the NDS strategies are orthogonal. The NDS generates an average profit of 1% per month, close to that of the momentum strategies over the sample period between 1926 and 2005, and various sub-sample periods, including those examined by Titman (1993,2001 ). The evidence shows that the differences in the average profits between the momentum and the NDS strategies are economically and statistically insignificant. The findings are robust with respect to market capitalization effects as well as sampling and period-specific effects in our simulations, where we randomly select 10 years for 100 times. From the viewpoint of investment, our findings suggest that pursuing the active momentum trading would not be beneficial relative to the passive 1/N naive diversification strategy.
